

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Wednesday, 19 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

	Mr. A.S. LALL	(India)
(later)	Mr. A.S. MEHTA	(India)

63-03378

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ASSUMPÇÃO de ARAÚJO

Mr. FRANK de COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GULELEV

Mr. M. KARASSILECNOV

Burma:

U TUN SHEIN

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. E.A. GOTTLIEB

Mr. R.M. PAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. J. BUCEN

Mr. V. VASILAR

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALMAYEHU

ATO M. HAMID

ATO M. GEMBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MENNA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. F. LUCICOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. ISU

Mr. L.C.N. CEI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. W. WLODZIMIECH

Mr. A. SKOTNICKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASEN

Mr. H. FLORESCU

Mr. N. COBESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von FLATEN

Mr. P. KELLIN

Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSECHIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. P.F. SHAKOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSAB

Mr. S. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT :

Mr. J.S.E. SHATTOCK

Mr. J.M. EDES

Mr. R.C. BETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLER

Mr. D.E. MARR

Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the ninety-fourth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker, there is one matter which I should like to mention. In order to permit the preparation during the recess of the final verbatim records of the present session of the Conference, delegations are requested to make every effort to submit corrections to their speeches in the verbatim records of the ninety-third meeting, that is, our last meeting, today's meeting and tomorrow's meeting before their departure from Geneva. This will help the Secretariat to prepare the records, and it is hoped that all delegations will co-operate.

I call now upon the representative of Romania, Mr. Macovescu, the first speaker for today.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): We have now reached the end of the third part of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and at the same time the end of this year. More than nine months have elapsed since we met in this hall in order to start the proceedings of this Conference. This is the right time to draw up the balance sheet of our work and of our efforts here. I shall endeavour to submit this balance sheet to representatives as it is seen by the Romanian delegation.

The first and most important task entrusted to this Committee -- a task which constitutes its very raison d'être -- is the working out of the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. It is only too natural to ask the question: what have we accomplished with regard to this fundamental task, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control? We have worked out -- and this not without maintaining certain differences of position, specified within the well-known brackets -- a draft preamble (ENDC/L.11/Rev.1) and the drafts of the first four articles of the treaty (ENDC/40/Rev.1, ENDC/55). Draft article 4 -- and this must be stated in all frankness -- merely lays down synthetically the great differences existing between the two positions with regard to the contents of the first stage. That is all. No further progress has been made.

Is there any necessity to stress that this is too little? Looking upon things as they are, "sine ira et studio", as Tacitus said when proceeding to write down and analyse the history of the times about 2,000 years ago, we have to admit that we have not fulfilled the task entrusted to us by peoples the world over. If we are willing

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to change this situation in the coming year -- and I hope that there is no one among us who does not want this --, then it is necessary to explain frankly the cause which prevented us from making concrete progress with respect to the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

In my opinion, the cause which made our Committee fail to bring to an end the main task entrusted to it consisted not so much in the differences of opinion on certain specific problems, but mainly in the maintaining by some of the delegations present here of an attitude which contradicts the very idea of negotiation.

I want to be very clear: the Romanian delegation does not underestimate in the least the importance, dimensions and complexity of the problems connected with general and complete disarmament. The Romanian delegation does not underestimate the extent of the differences existing between us, nor does it think that they could be easily overcome. We cannot accept ambiguous formulas which would later become mere words on mere scraps of paper. Neither can the differences be maintained in their integrity, because that would result in our failing to reach agreement. Proceeding from that point of view, the Romanian delegation has been, and still is, of the opinion that the very essence of our work here is to negotiate, and that this Committee is a negotiating body and not a rostrum from which to explain rigid, non-negotiable positions.

Before looking into the situation prevailing in our Committee in this respect, might I be allowed to submit an opinion which the Romanian delegation has arrived at after a month of work in the Committee. We have often been told here about two philosophies. The term "philosophy" appears to us rather pompous, and that is why I am not going to employ it. I shall use a term which is more modest, but at the same time nearer to reality: concept. Indeed, two essential positions have obviously emerged in the course of our proceedings, expressing two essential concepts on general and complete disarmament. Underlying the attitude of the socialist delegations is the concept that, taking into account the interests of every State and the interests of mankind as a whole, general and complete disarmament must be agreed upon and implemented in as short a time as possible in order to avoid a nuclear war and to save humanity from incalculable material and spiritual losses. As we see it, the main goal of our negotiations is to safeguard mankind from a devastating nuclear war. On the other hand, it appears to us that quite a different concept lies at the basis of the

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positions of the Western delegations, namely, that of pushing the threat of the danger of a nuclear war into the background and of bringing into the foreground certain interests which, to put it frankly, are not the interests of mankind and do not correspond to reality. We are firmly convinced that the responsibility for the fate and the future of the whole of humanity is infinitely greater than calculations such as "balance of deterrent capacity", "balance of retaliation capacity" and "balance of terror".

The two concepts have acquired concrete form in the two draft treaties submitted to the Committee by the delegations of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2 and Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2) respectively. The essential merit of the Soviet draft lies in the fact that the implementation of its provisions would lead to the carrying out of general and complete disarmament under international control; to saving the whole of mankind, in the first stage of disarmament, from the danger of nuclear war; and to ensuring the security of all States to an equal extent in the course of the disarmament process. The basic shortcomings of the Western proposals lie, as the Romanian delegation is convinced, in the fact that their implementation would lead to the perpetuation throughout the duration of the disarmament process, and even after that, of the danger embodied in nuclear weapons; to the perpetuation of the lack of security for all States; and to the creation of military advantages for one side to the detriment of the other.

The method envisaged by the United States and the other Western Powers -- that of percentage, across-the-board reductions -- would not solve the problem of eliminating the possibility of a nuclear war. According to the system proposed by the United States, the danger of such a war would be maintained not only during the first stage, but also throughout the second and third stages.

In this connexion, we cannot fail to recall that the Western Powers have been, and still are, opposed even to the adoption of definite obligations which would expressly sanction the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the United States plan does not rule out the maintenance of nuclear weapons even after the implementation of disarmament. It is known that every time representatives of the Western Powers have been requested to make clear their position in this matter and to say whether, according to their own proposals, nuclear weapons would still

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exist at the end of the disarmament process, they have not ruled out the possibility of equipping the international armed forces with nuclear weapons. I consider that there is no need to stress that the maintenance of nuclear weapons is unacceptable under any designation in conditions of a world without weapons.

To all this must be added the fact that, under the system suggested by the Western Powers, a confusion is made -- doubtless a wilful confusion -- between conventional weapons and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, which means that the equation sign is placed between things which differ in quality. What interests us here is not so much the lack of logic and the unscientific character of such an assimilation of things which are not assimilable as the fact that such an assimilation is incompatible with the very necessity to put an end, as urgently as possible, to the danger of a nuclear war. If disarmament has become the primary international issue of our time, it is mainly due to the fact that above all an end must be put to the nuclear danger, and as speedily as possible. Nuclear weapons must be liquidated once and for all. Any programme which does not answer that fundamental requirement cannot be an efficient disarmament programme.

In the course of the negotiations in our Committee the Western delegations have tried to justify their position by referring to the principle of balanced disarmament and of ensuring equal security for all. But does that correspond to reality? If one looks, however briefly, into the United States proposals, it becomes evident that precisely from the point of view of the equal right of all States to security that plan does not give satisfaction. Its implementation, far from ensuring the security of mankind as a whole and of any State in particular, would lead to the perpetuation of the present state of insecurity.

We are often told in this Committee that we have to be realistic. I fully agree with that way of looking at things. It means that with regard to all problems we must take into account objective reality. But what is the reality? The reality is that it is precisely because the Western governments are guided by such slogans as "balance of terror", "balance of retaliation capacity" and "balance of deterrent capacity", presenting them as formulas for ensuring security, that the precarious state of insecurity in the world today has been arrived at.



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Where does this policy lead to? To security? It is recognized throughout the world that the nuclear war at present menacing mankind would cost every country tremendous losses in human lives and material and spiritual assets -- that flourishing towns with millions of inhabitants might be turned into barren deserts in less than thirty minutes. If that is security then, I would ask, what is insecurity? I hope the Chairman will note that up to now I have spoken about the situation prevailing today; but with every passing day, while we are holding our discussions here, that "pseudo-security" or, to put it better, that lack of security, is growing continuously. One has to be neither an expert in mathematics nor a specialist in ballistics to be able to understand that it will not be long before an attack against and the destruction of any inhabited centre would be possible not in thirty minutes, but in fifteen minutes or even less.

That cannot be and indeed is not by any means a triumph for the idea of security either for mankind or even for those who believe that their own security could be built upon the ruins of other people's security. That cannot be called disarmament; it cannot lead to the desired results. As an English thinker once put it: "Against a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result; it produces no result at all." However, if it is not a concern to ensure the security of the people which determines the position taken up by the Western Powers, what then is their real object? I should have preferred it if the answer had not been the one that follows; nevertheless, facts are facts, they speak for themselves and there can be no other conclusion, no matter how much casuistry is woven around the subject. Both the plan submitted here by the United States and the statements made by delegations of the Western Powers in the Committee testify to their preoccupation with obtaining a one-sided military advantage to the detriment of the other side. The most telling example in that respect is perhaps the attitude of the Western Powers on the problem of military bases located on foreign territories. While providing for the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles by 30 per cent in the first stage, the United States plan proposes to maintain foreign military bases in the same stage. That proposal is equivalent to asking that the socialist States, while giving up an important portion of the missiles which form the most appropriate means of dealing a retaliatory blow to nuclear aggression, should face the danger represented by the network of military bases situated in their close vicinity. It is unrealistic to think that an agreement could be reached which would create a military advantage for one party at the expense of the other party.

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The same vices inherent in the Western stand on the issue of general and complete disarmament are also to be found in the Western position regarding the task of our Committee to reach agreement on the cessation and banning of nuclear weapon tests. In that regard also, the stand of the socialist countries takes into account the equal right of all parties to security. Under that plan nobody would be at a disadvantage; no military advantage is created for anybody. We propose that all nuclear weapon tests should stop and should be banned in all environments for all time.

The position taken up by the Western Powers in that field also reflects their lack of a realistic approach, because it is highly unrealistic to think that in negotiating any such issue one of the parties might overlook the other party's desire to secure unilateral military advantages. Now then are we to interpret the proposal made by the Western Powers to stop nuclear tests only if the Soviet Union submits to obligatory international on-site inspection (ENDC/58) or, if that condition is not accepted, to ban nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water while underground tests would continue (ENDC/59)? Practical experience and the achievements of science and technology prove that there is no need for any international on-site inspection in order to verify how the underground nuclear weapon tests ban is being observed. An insistence on such inspection under these circumstances cannot but serve aims which are alien to the cause of maintaining peace and security all over the world. The proposal seeks to secure important military advantages. The same desire has also found expression in the proposal submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom with regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water while allowing them underground. Thus an exception is being made for the very environment in which the United States is carrying out tests with a perseverance and on a scale which set one thinking.

It is precisely the rigidity of the stand adopted by the Western Powers that constitutes the main obstacle in the way to fulfilling the desire of the peoples to put an end once and for all to nuclear weapon tests. It is precisely that rigidity which prevents our reaching an agreement to cease all nuclear weapon tests immediately, or at all events not later than 1 January 1963, as provided for by resolution 1762 (XVII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations (see ENDC/63).

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I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to renew the expression of my government's desire that after 1 January 1963 there should not be any more nuclear tests in any environment whatsoever.

On all those problems positions are still far apart from each other. That is a fact. But we must reach agreement on general and complete disarmament as well as on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests; that, too, is a fact. In order to change radically the situation now obtaining, in order to reach agreement, it is necessary for those positions which have been proved to constitute a barrier to agreement to be abandoned.

Nowadays there is no unsettled international problem that cannot be solved if it is approached with a determination to reach agreement, and if all parties give proof of flexibility and of a sincere desire to meet the other party halfway and understand the necessity and usefulness of rational compromise. If we end this year without being able to report to our governments and our peoples -- to the peoples the world over -- any concrete success in our work, the reason is that up to now only one of the parties has proved to be inspired by the necessary spirit.

The socialist delegations have made rational concessions -- for example, with regard to the duration of the disarmament process, the level of armed forces to be maintained at the end of stage I, the reduction of conventional armaments, the maintenance of a strictly limited number of missiles during the first two stages by the Soviet Union and the United States, and so on.

The socialist delegations have given proof of the same constructive spirit with regard to the problem of the cessation and the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In this connexion, it is sufficient to recall the proposal made by the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.86, p.35) that, in addition to the use of national systems of detection of seismic phenomena -- which, as a matter of fact, are fully sufficient so far as we are concerned --, automatic seismic stations may be used too. The Soviet Union has offered to admit the installation of three such stations on its territory to which, if necessary, access might be permitted to members of an international centre in order to install, replace and transport back the respective recording instruments.

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However, the Western delegations have clung to their old positions. At every step made by the socialist delegations in order to meet the stand taken by the Western Powers, the answer of the Western delegations has been: "Yes, That is something. It is a step forward; but it is not sufficient. Let them take more such steps. They have not yet reached our positions". In other words, a concession made by the socialist side is used by the other side in order to ask for more concessions, which the socialist side is expected to grant.

Clearly, one cannot reach agreement in such a way. Concessions cannot be made only by one side. It is precisely this to which I was referring in the introductory part of my remarks when I spoke about the nature of our work as being essentially negotiation. A rational compromise is a compromise that takes account of the interests of all parties, and not only of those of one party alone. It is necessary that the efforts made by the socialist side in order to reduce the gap between the positions be answered by similar efforts from the Western side too.

In this Conference there must be no victor and no vanquished. Nobody must go home from here either on the shield or under the shield. Here it is only peace that must be victorious; reason and life must be the only ones to celebrate triumph.

The Romanian delegation wishes that all delegations present here may give proof of wisdom, patience, perseverance, a sense of reality and, above all, the will to reach agreement. If all delegations will evince such a spirit, the problems facing us can be settled. They must be settled without delay because this is in the interests of the tranquillity, life and future of the peoples. The more weapons that exist all over the world, the bigger grows the risk that the peoples will be thrown into a new world-wide conflagration. When it comes to the issue of general and complete disarmament, as well as to that of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the very existence and the prospects of every people in the world are at stake, and not only those of one or the other of them. All the peoples -- those represented at this table as well as those not represented here -- are certainly vitally interested to an equal extent in the success of our proceedings. Hence the great responsibility incumbent upon every State, every government and every delegation.

(Mr. Macoveanu, Romania)

Regarding the position of the delegation of Romania, I should like to recall, with permission, the words of the President of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic, Mr. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who said:

"In our days, when in the world arms with an unprecedented power of destruction have been accumulated, to ensure peace has become the most ardent aspiration of mankind. There is a sure way to maintain and consolidate world peace; the implementation of general and complete disarmament; the settlement of outstanding problems exclusively by peaceful means; and the development of co-operation between all countries, irrespective of their social systems, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. This is the line which the Romanian People's Republic, as well as the other socialist States, is promoting unflinchingly in its international policy".

Please allow me, on behalf of the delegation of Romania, to wish that the year to come may bring you, Mr. Chairman, the two co-Chairmen, and all the representatives present here, good health and joy, and -- this above all -- that it may bring to all of us full success in the fulfilment of the dream of mankind: general and complete disarmament.

I should like these wishes of the delegation of Romania to be conveyed to the representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Epstein, and to his deputies, as well as to all the officials who have helped our work to proceed in the best conditions.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Yesterday marked the last meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests until after the end of our agreed recess. Today I should like to discuss some of the principal elements which have been developed in the test ban negotiations over the period of this resumed session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

Before I begin the principal portion of my statement, I should like to note that, in spite of the apparent indications that the Soviet Union might have stopped its nuclear test series, we unfortunately meet once again today against a background of continuing atmospheric tests by the Soviet Union, and I should like to emphasize that fact.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Yesterday the United States Atomic Energy Commission announced that the Soviet Union conducted two tests in the atmosphere in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya on Tuesday. The Atomic Energy Commission said that the explosions were in the intermediate yield range with an explosive force of less than 1 million tons of TNT but more than 20,000 tons of TNT.

My fellow representatives, the Soviet Union is continuing atmospheric tests in the Arctic -- let there be no mistake about that -- despite its solemn statements here.

These detonations were the thirty-third and the thirty-fourth to be announced by the United States in the current Soviet test series. The United States does not of course announce all Soviet tests which are detected and identified.

I think that these continuing explosions by the Soviet Union in the atmosphere present a striking contrast with Mr. Tsarapkin's insistent questions to me yesterday about whether the United States was willing to stop all nuclear tests in accordance with paragraph 2, as the Soviet Union reads it, of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762A (XVII). I shall have more to say about this subject at a later point in my statement.

Among the new elements which have appeared in our negotiations, perhaps none has caused greater discussion than the proposal to use automatic seismic stations first put forward by the United Kingdom and the United States (GEN/DIS/PV.337, p.11) on 28 August 1961, and forthwith rejected by the Soviet Union. That suggestion was recently also made to my delegation privately by the Soviet Union in New York, before we came back here to Geneva. Later, the Soviet delegation made public its interest in the proposal to use automatic seismic stations, and at our plenary meeting on 10 December the Soviet representative put forward certain details regarding the Soviet proposal on automatic stations (ENDC/PV.90, pp.13 et seq.).

While the Soviet delegation was putting forward those proposals for the use of automatic seismic stations, it made it clear that if the West accepted the use of automatic stations there would be no place in a detection system for international co-ordination and supervision of nationally manned detection stations or for a certain number of obligatory on-site inspections of otherwise unidentified seismic events by the international commission. In other words, it was "either/or". In effect, the Soviet Union was asking the West to accept in principle a vague, foggy

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proposal, which was unclear scientifically in its detail, in return for complete abandonment by the United Kingdom and the United States of all the basic elements in their position, which their best-trained scientists after much research had told them are fundamentally necessary to assure adequate control. And so, again, we find that, although the United Kingdom and the United States have put forward many constructive proposals for agreement on a nuclear test ban, there is no forward movement whatsoever by the Soviet Union.

The United States and the United Kingdom have replied to the Soviet proposal by indicating that they know of no scientific capabilities of automatic stations which would make unnecessary the use of internationally co-ordinated and supervised nationally manned detection stations and the requirement for a certain number of obligatory on-site inspections by the international commission to assure adequate identification of seismic events. They have asked the Soviet Union for scientific clarification of its position, but the Soviet Union, so far at least, has refused to make clear the scientific basis on which it has proposed automatic stations or how it believes the information gathered by those stations might be most usefully employed, or how the collected data would be transmitted, or how often they would be transmitted.

The United Kingdom and the United States have said to our Soviet colleagues that an adequately built and properly located system of automatic stations might possibly be useful to increase the numbers of seismic events which would be detected by any effective and internationally co-ordinated control system. In addition, they have said that automatic stations, if properly built and located, might also, but to a lesser extent than in the case of the detection of seismic events, increase the numbers of certain types of earthquake which an effective detection system might identify. To achieve such results, both in the area of detection and of identification, the United Kingdom and the United States have said that they believe such a system of automatic stations would have to contain an adequate number of seismometers, or arrays of seismometers, operating in seismic areas and as an adjunct to an internationally supervised and co-ordinated nationally manned system of appropriately located and equipped detection posts.

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Also, the United Kingdom and the United States believe that appropriate numbers of properly equipped and located automatic seismic stations might be usefully employed to check upon data provided by nationally manned, internationally co-ordinated seismic stations in the detection system. We noted yesterday that the Soviet Union appeared to agree that such a use of automatic stations would be feasible and helpful in any control system (ENDC/SC.1/PV.50, p.5).

However, the Soviet Union yesterday also charged the United Kingdom and the United States with having completely distorted the Soviet Union's proposal for automatic stations when they stated that automatic stations should be used only as an adjunct to a regular system of internationally supervised, nationally manned control posts and not in place of such a system or in place of a necessary number of obligatory on-site inspections of unidentified events by the international commission.

Now, in order to meet those charges by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have formally proposed the scientific and technical study by a group of qualified experts of the use of automatic seismic stations, to determine their usefulness in an effective and co-ordinated detection system and the exact capabilities both for detection and identification of a detection system into which such automatic stations might be integrated. I should like to emphasize at this point that my delegation and my government are open-minded on the results of any scientific discussion. If the Soviet Union does, indeed, have any scientific evidence -- which it has consistently implied but refuses to divulge -- that national systems, with or without automatic stations, can solve all the outstanding problems of detection, location and identification of nuclear tests, we are ready and anxious to examine such scientific evidence and to be guided by the results of such an objective examination.

Unfortunately, every time this proposal has arisen in our negotiations the Soviet Union has replied with a number of vague and unhelpful arguments which lead us to believe that it has not really investigated, or does not really know, how those automatic stations would work or how they would be equipped, or what arrays of seismometers would be put in them, or how the data would be transmitted or how it would be tied into the international control system.



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Hence, in the absence of scientific data, the Soviet Union, first of all, says that the West must agree in principle -- whatever that term means, for I must confess I do not know -- to the Soviet proposal on automatic stations before the technical details can be discussed. In other words, a policy of "Agree first and think afterwards"; or perhaps "Agree first and regret later". But we would like to know just what principle the Soviet Union is asking us to agree to, and how agreement on that principle will in practice affect the treaty which we are negotiating. It seems to us only reasonable to say that a knowledge of the technical scientific details certainly will be important to discover these facts. We do not, of course, expect necessarily to be presented with a complete detailed plan down to the last nut, bolt and screw, nor a detailed blueprint of a system of automatic seismic stations, or even of one such station, but we would like to agree now on the scientific capability of any detection system which might include automatic stations to detect, to locate and to identify tests in the underground environment. Should this technical question be resolved by the experts, or by expert study as we have proposed, it is my belief that we would be much closer to agreement.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union tells us that it will not take part in these technical discussions because the West has already prejudged the outcome of such scientific discussion. But this line of reasoning, when compared with Soviet demands to agree in principle to its position before the technical scientific talks can start, clearly indicates that it is the Soviet Union and not the United Kingdom or the United States which is prejudging the outcome of the scientific talks. We firmly believe that a scientific study group could meet free from political pre-conditions, and we have asked the Soviet Union to join us in such talks.

There is another good reason to hold scientific discussions, particularly with regard to the proposed automatic stations, of which, as we understand it, there is no prototype, and which have never actually been placed in operation, nor even tested in the field. We have asked the Soviet Union both publicly and privately what purposes it believes those automatic seismic stations will fulfil. That would be a useful question for the experts to examine. In this connexion, we would like to ask the Soviet delegation to explain the reasons why the three proposed sites in the Soviet Union were chosen. If those geographical sites were chosen for first zone -- that is,

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up to 1,100 kilometers.-- detection and identification, then, as we have pointed out to our Soviet colleagues, they are located too far from the seismic areas, and many more automatic stations might be required to aid in reducing the need for on-site inspection. But, on the other hand, if automatic stations at these proposed sites are to detect from the third zone -- beyond 2,500 kilometers -- then manned stations might be more useful, and unmanned stations would not be a great deal of help, if indeed any help at all, in the problem of reducing the need for on-site inspections.

Finally, the Soviet Union says that scientific study of the question of automatic stations will delay our negotiations. We have two replies to offer to this point.

First, it seems clear to us that we are now in a political impasse over the question of the adequate control for a cessation of underground tests. The Soviet representative at numerous times during our recent meetings has indicated that this indeed is the case, and that in the area of control of underground tests the two sides are farthest apart. Technical discussions offer one good hope of finding a way out of this impasse. We may well delay negotiations more by continuing our discussions as at present than by convening a scientific study group.

Second, we have offered to discuss these scientific questions at a political level if the Soviet Union so desires in order to avoid a delay. Also, we have promised to set some sort of a deadline on these scientific talks, if a deadline will make clear our intention that scientific talks should not delay actual agreement.

It seems to my delegation that recent happenings over the weekend, particularly in connexion with the welter of confusing reports coming from Stockholm on whether the Soviet Union was in fact conducting tests in the Arctic -- they were first announced and then denied, and this was then followed by the actual test of yesterday, as announced by the Atomic Energy Commission -- seem to my delegation to make clear the absolute necessity for reaching agreement on the precise technical basis for, and the capabilities of, a control system, especially on this very difficult problem of identification. When I say that the announcements coming from Stockholm over the weekend concerning possible Soviet nuclear tests could be termed "confusing", that is an understatement. Perhaps the Soviet Union actually was testing. We do not know. The questions of the detection, location and identification of nuclear weapon tests, as we have pointed out many times in the past, pose extremely difficult scientific

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problems requiring many internationally co-ordinated detection posts with modern instrumentation properly located. The experience in Stockholm over the weekend is but one example of what we have tried to make clear might result with regard to a national system of test detection and identification stations which was not broadly enough based, and not sufficiently scientifically co-ordinated on a worldwide basis under appropriate international supervision and control.

The confusion over the weekend was best summed up by the remarks of one Swedish scientist who said: "The most interesting aspect of this measuring result is perhaps at last to show how unsatisfactory our methods for judging atomic weapon detonations are anyway and that many independent measuring stations are needed to determine whether any explosion has occurred or not."

This seems to my delegation to make it clear that, even with respect to atmospheric explosions, the problem of detection and identification is very difficult. There is even a comparatively greater difficulty, as we all know, with regard to the detection, location and identification of underground explosions.

I believe it follows from the preceding discussion that a scientific study group, concerned with the usefulness of automatic stations, their equipment and their co-ordination with nationally manned detection stations under international supervision and with the other essential, basic technical problems connected with detection, location and identification systems, would be extremely useful at this time. We simply cannot understand our Soviet colleague's flat refusal to co-operate with us in this respect.

Before I turn to another question, there is one other aspect of the Soviet proposal on automatic seismic stations which I should like to discuss. The Soviet Union, in clarifying its proposal (ENDC/FV.90, p.15), indicated that it would be prepared to accept the placement and retrieval of automatic stations by international personnel under appropriate safeguards against the possibility of espionage, such as those proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States with regard to on-site inspections: that is, transporting the personnel in Soviet aircraft flown by Soviet pilots under Soviet travel plans.

My delegation has already noted that this proposal of the Soviet Union has many interesting aspects, particularly in relation to the very difficult problems of on-site inspection visits to the Soviet Union to identify otherwise unidentifiable seismic events.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

It seems to my delegation that the Soviet Union has accepted, in connexion with the proposed visits by international personnel to automatic stations, three very important principles which are also pertinent to on-site inspection. Those three principles are as follows.

First, the Soviet Union has admitted that international personnel can be trusted to visit the Soviet Union on a task connected with control over nuclear weapon tests.

Second, the Soviet Union has admitted that such international visits to the Soviet Union will not be tantamount to espionage operations carried on in the Soviet Union.

Third, the Soviet Union has indicated that there are a number of safeguards, such as those we have suggested, which will ensure that the security of the Soviet Union is not endangered by inspection visits from personnel of the international scientific commission.

Heretofore the Soviet Union appears to have maintained entirely the opposite: it refused to trust international personnel; it made their visits tantamount to so-called espionage on Soviet territory; and it would not accept the fact that safeguards could be devised to insure against any possibility of danger to Soviet security. We see in this particular portion of the Soviet proposal on automatic stations an important and indeed potentially significant area of movement by the Soviet Union in the field of visitations. If the proposal for visits to automatic seismic stations were to be realistically applied to the question of obligatory on-site inspections by the international commission to identify otherwise unidentifiable seismic events, we might well be able to make real progress. So far the failure to make progress on this issue is due solely to intransigence on the part of the Soviet Union.

In this connexion, we hope the Soviet Union will recognize that, if applied to the question of on-site inspection, these principles which I have just enumerated would leave but a very few hurdles in the way of agreement to a small number of annual visits to determine the nature of seismic events. The arrangements for on-site visits and automatic station visits are in fact similar in a number of ways. They have the following similarities.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

One: visits in both cases would be by international personnel.

Two: the Soviet Union would accept an obligation to receive international inspectors in the case of each of the two types of visit -- automatic station inspections and on-site inspection teams.

Three: the Soviet Union in both cases, we suppose, would not be prevented in the final analysis from barring each type of visit if it actually chose to break its solemn treaty obligation; but, practically speaking, in both cases there would be an obligation, and in both cases, if the visits were prevented in contradiction of the treaty obligation assumed, the consequences of treaty failure would be the same.

Four: both types of visits would be conducted under appropriate safeguards against any possibility of damage to any State's security.

Five: the Soviet Union would be forewarned on the timing of such visits in each case, although automatic station visits, to be scientifically workable, might possibly be made on a regular, agreed schedule.

Six: while the Soviet Union would not know at the time of signature of the treaty, in the case of an on-site inspection as opposed to an automatic station visit, precisely where the team was to go in the Soviet Union until the inspection procedure was begun, the arrangements for working out precise geographic areas are very accurately and specifically set forth in the treaty and the conditions of geographic location set forth in the treaty would have to be met before any on-site inspection could take place. The Soviet Union will of course know what the size of the area to be inspected will be, and its location will be determined in advance of the inspection by the occurrence of a seismic event. Under those circumstances, every area to be inspected will be known a number of days in advance to the Soviet Union.

These striking similarities between what the Soviet Union has offered with regard to automatic stations and what is required to ensure a certain number of obligatory on-site inspections should make clear to all that, given good will and a realistic application of these principles by the Soviet Union, only a relatively small difference separates us on this inspection issue.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Yesterday, at our test ban Sub-Committee meeting, the Soviet representative again raised the question of United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) (ENDC/SC.1/PV.50, p.7). The Soviet representative repeated what seems to us to be the completely unrealistic argument, which he has developed during our negotiations, that that resolution calls upon all States to end all tests by 1 January 1963 under an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium, if agreement on a test ban treaty is not reached by that date.

But we have made it clear that we do not believe that this resolution of the General Assembly can be read in this unreasonable manner by emphasizing any one of its paragraphs or provisions above any other part or indeed above the resolution as a whole. This view of how the resolution should be interpreted seems to have met with the general approval of our Conference, with the exception of the members of the Soviet bloc.

We believe that our goal here should be the banning of all nuclear tests under an adequate and effective treaty with an effective detection and identification system and that we should strive to reach it, as set forth in paragraph 2 of the resolution, by 1 January 1963. To reach this goal the United States and the United Kingdom believe we must follow one of the two routes set out for us by the General Assembly. Paragraph 3 of the resolution provides that we should reach agreement on a permanent and comprehensive ban, negotiating the differences which remain in the way of such agreement on a mutually acceptable basis. Paragraph 6 provides the second route to agreement. Paragraph 6 asks for a partial ban on tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water together with an interim arrangement which would include assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission.

Thus far the Soviet Union has completely blocked progress along either of these routes. It has adamantly refused to negotiate a comprehensive treaty along scientifically sound lines -- a treaty such as that set out by the United Kingdom and the United States in Conference document ENDC/58. The Soviet Union has also refused to consider the possibility of an interim arrangement -- possibly since it is continuing atmospheric tests in the Soviet Arctic, and possibly because it plans to continue such tests -- describing such a temporary solution to our problem as being almost worse

(Mr. Dean, United States)

than no agreement at all. Now the Soviet Union wishes to try to impose another unilateral arrangement on nuclear tests on the United Kingdom and the United States in lieu of an effective and workable negotiated treaty ending all nuclear tests. Under such an arrangement, the Soviet Union would of course be free to break its pledge, just as it broke Chairman Khrushchev's solemn pledge of 14 January 1960 and Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba. No matter how many times the Soviet Union violates its clear and unmistakable statements, we are nevertheless asked to give it another chance -- and to trust it just once again.

The United States has done its level best to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on an effective treaty banning all tests, but the United States is just not prepared to accept another sad experience with a unilateral uninspected arrangement on tests; nor is it prepared to accept an unworkable system of "black boxes" in its Christmas stocking. We do not want to open these "black boxes" and find a dead Santa Claus.

We hope that during the forthcoming recess the Soviet Government will find the time to reflect soberly on the problems which now confront us, rather than upon the shallow propaganda advantages of a new unilateral announcement about an uninspected moratorium on testing. For in the long run we do not really believe that the Soviet Union can take satisfactory refuge in another uninspected moratorium only to break it for short-term military gain some time in the future.

Whether we like it or not, a nuclear test ban has become the base on which all our progress on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world will be built. Failure to reach an adequate and effective agreement on a test ban treaty, or prolongation of that failure for whatever narrow national interests such prolongation might serve, will weigh heavily against the achievement of our central aim of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

As I pointed out at the meeting of our Sub-Committee yesterday (ENDC/SC.1/PV.50, p.31), my government will not give up hope of reaching an adequate and effective nuclear test ban agreement. We ask the Soviet Union to do the same, and to demonstrate its hope in the way in which we believe we have constructively demonstrated ours over the past years and months, by accepting, or at least working intelligently with us on, our constructive proposals which will lead us to the agreement we are all seeking, that for the ending of all tests in all environments under adequate controls.

Mr. TSARAFKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): At our meeting on 14 December we heard a statement by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean (ENDC/PV.92, pp.11 et seq.), in which he expounded -- one might say behind a smoke screen -- the general approach of the United States to the solution of the basic main problems of disarmament. Frankly, this statement by the United States representative produced a most strange impression and, to put it plainly, alarmed us. We know that this statement by Mr. Dean provoked a certain negative reaction also on the part of other members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

In this statement, which was made in a most arrogant, provocative and, I would say, bellicose tone, Mr. Dean tried to describe to us the general attitude and approach of the Western Powers, above all of the United States, to the problems of disarmament. The gist of this approach, as Mr. Dean explained to us, can be reduced to two main conclusions. First, the United States essentially refuses to take any steps to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. Secondly, the United States is trying to impose upon the other participants in our negotiations such conditions as are in keeping with the military interests of the United States, and discredit the cause of disarmament. The basis for these conclusions is as follows.

The representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, stated, and I quote:

"United States officials will not be impressed by exhortations, such as those from the Soviet bloc delegations here, that the highest norm or standard for disarmament negotiations must be 'the elimination of the risk of nuclear war in the first stage'." (ENDC/PV.92, p.14)

As if developing this thought expressed by the United States Representative, the representative of Italy asserted that the efforts of the Soviet Union to eliminate without delay the danger of nuclear war are "unrealistic and utopian." (ENDC/PV.93, p.5). The members of our Committee have a right to ask the Western Powers why and on what ground they consider "unrealistic and utopian" the task of eliminating the threat of nuclear war at the very beginning of disarmament -- that is in the first stage. It seems to us that the attitudes of the different States to this question have been sufficiently clearly marked out. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries declare themselves quite definitely in favour of immediate elimination of the danger of nuclear war, and put forward concrete proposals for this purpose. The non-aligned



(Mr. Tsarankin, USSR)

States which, as we know, have no nuclear weapons or missiles, consider it all the more essential to free the world as soon as possible from the threat of nuclear war. The debate which took place at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly provides eloquent confirmation of this.

What, then, hinders nuclear disarmament? Who is obstructing solution of the problem of rapidly eliminating the danger of nuclear war? Only the United States, only the Western Powers; nobody else. This is the hidden reason which the Western Powers ought to admit honestly and openly, instead of hiding behind baseless and unsubstantiated statements to the effect that the task of eliminating the danger of nuclear war at the first stage of disarmament is unrealistic or utopian.

I shall now pass on to the attempts of the United States to secure a military advantage. The United States representative, Mr. Dean, stated that the United States, which now leads the camp of the Western Powers, will only accept such proposals as are in keeping with its own interests. The United States representative stated with brazen haughtiness and arrogance that the United States is not interested in what other States think about United States military bases and the Western military blocs. The United States intends in any case to retain its present military structure.

Further, the United States representative asserted that the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2) is based on a single principle: maintenance during the whole disarmament process of a balance of forces between the two sides. This, however, bears no relation to reality.

The Western proposals apply one yardstick and one principle to those elements of the war machine which particularly interest the Western States, and another principle and a completely different yardstick to the other elements of the war machine. As an example, let us take the question we were discussing at our last meetings -- I mean the question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- and let us compare the approach of the Western Powers to the solution of this problem, on the one hand, with their approach to the solution of the problem of reducing the numbers of the armed forces of States, on the other. In regard to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, we hear statements by the Western Powers that only a percentage reduction can be considered the most reasonable method for eliminating

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

them, and this approach is said to have the merit that the present correlation of forces will be maintained and thus the security of States reinforced. Further, the representatives of the Western Powers assert that if we adopt the methods of laying down certain levels or leaving with both sides some definite and strictly limited quantity of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, then, in the opinion of the Western Powers, this would upset the balance and threaten their security. That is what the United States representative tells us when we deal with the question of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. If the Western Powers prefer the method of percentage reductions because they see in it the advantage that it provides a possibility of preserving the military balance which has been established between the various parties to an agreement, then elementary consistency demands that the Western Powers should also follow this method in dealing with other elements of the war machines of States. But they do not. Let us see what method the Western Powers propose for reducing the armed forces of States. Towards this problem they take a different attitude. They object to percentage reductions and stubbornly insist that, in regard to numbers of armed forces, a definite and equal level should be fixed for the Soviet Union and for the United States. They insist that a ceiling should be fixed for the numbers of the armed forces of all States. From the course of our negotiations in the recent past we know, however, that the Western Powers have objected with extraordinary stubbornness to the Soviet proposals for a proportional reduction of numbers of armed forces and of armaments. Everyone remembers the Western Powers' opposition to the proposal to reduce the armed forces by one-third. They argued then that equal conditions of security for the Soviet Union and the United States and for other parties to an agreement could only be guaranteed by laying down definite and equal levels for the Soviet Union and the United States, and also correspondingly for the other countries.

If we now compare the Western Powers' approach to determination of the method for reducing nuclear weapon delivery vehicles with their approach to determination of the method for reducing the numbers of the armed forces, their inconsistency is obvious to everyone. In the one case they try to prove to us the advantage of percentage reductions, and in the other case they say precisely the opposite.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

What is the reason for this? Their representatives have themselves answered this question. They state that the NATO countries have an advantage in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, whereas the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have a superiority in conventional armed forces.

We have no intention of entering into a dispute about who possesses the quantitative or qualitative advantage in this or that type of armament, or who is lagging behind. It is difficult to persuade a person with a predetermined point of view. But we have accumulated much experience in this matter. One could recall, for instance, the various speculations and calculations that used to be put forward about the speed with which the Soviet Union would be able to master the secret of nuclear weapons. It is also well known that the Soviet Union, with a rapidity which startled everyone and upset all calculations and predictions, eliminated the United States atomic monopoly, and this, of course, did much to safeguard peace. There is no need to prove that the Soviet Union was the first to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles and continues firmly to maintain that lead. It seems to us that the magnificent scientific and technical results, which were shown in the launching of rockets by the Soviet Union, whether into outer space or into distant regions of the Pacific, and their landing with astonishing accuracy on the moon, on which pennants of the Soviet Union were dropped and which was photographed from the opposite side, as well as their landing in the predetermined area in the Pacific, on the one hand, and the United States nuclear charges which fell to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean in the vicinity of Johnston Island and contaminated the water of the ocean with their radioactivity, on the other hand -- all these facts show better than any words the real situation in regard to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. These facts are highly relevant and it was hardly fitting for Mr. Dean to adopt such a haughty, arrogant and bellicose tone in his statement on 14 December. However, we shall not go deeper into this dispute; that is not our task. Our task is to achieve an agreement on general and complete disarmament, and that is what we are guided by.

Returning to this subject, we cannot disregard the arguments of the Western Powers' representatives who do not base themselves on the interests of disarmament, but on considerations aimed at securing for the Western Powers military advantages in respect of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. This has been the main foundation

(Mr. Tsarukin, USSR)

of their argument for the need to adopt percentage reductions for these types of armament. Thus, in proposing percentage reductions for nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the Western Powers' motive is their desire to retain the advantage which they believe they have obtained over the socialist countries. However, where the Western Powers think the socialist countries have an advantage, they demand the establishment of definite equal levels; that is to say, they are trying to cancel the advantage of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries by levelling out the opportunities of both sides. And this double policy, this double approach, the Western Powers represent -- to use Mr. Dean's words -- as a reasonable, fair and scientifically-based approach.

We have not yet touched on the problem of eliminating the nuclear weapons themselves. In this regard the Western position is still more inconsistent, still further from the aims of disarmament, and represents neither an honest nor a conscientious approach. The Western Powers do not envisage any serious measures in respect of nuclear weapons before the third and final stage of disarmament. It is only in the last stage that they are prepared to consider the elimination of nuclear weapons, and then only conditionally, since their proposal provides for the possibility of leaving these weapons in the hands of international armed forces. All they intend to do before this point, that is before the third stage, is to transfer a certain quantity of stockpiled fissile materials and register existing nuclear bombs. Compare this approach of theirs to nuclear weapons with their proposed percentage reduction of conventional weapons and of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and you will see quite clearly that the underlying aim of the Western Powers in disarmament negotiations is to weaken the defensive capability of peace-loving States and at the same time to keep the world under the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by ensuring that missiles and other nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are retained as long as possible.

This approach by the Western Powers to disarmament problems, their desire to use the disarmament negotiations for the purpose of obtaining military advantages for the Western Powers and weakening the defensive capability of peace-loving States, are particularly obvious in the matter of eliminating military bases on the territory of other States.

(Mr. Gerasimkin, USSR)

We have no need to prove the aggressive character of these bases. History itself proves it. We need only cite the remarks of the Syrian representative in the First Committee of the General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1274, p.51) when he drew attention to the sinister part which foreign bases played at the time of the Suez crisis in relation to the country represented here by our respected neighbour on our left. Foreign bases on the territory of other States have always been and still are hotbeds of aggression, means of suppressing the freedom and the independence of peoples, and bulwarks of imperialist policy. Foreign military bases inevitably threaten the security of the States which have surrendered territory to them. These bases are a deadly danger to them. The sooner foreign military bases on the territory of other States are eliminated, the firmer will world peace become, the less will be the probability of a thermo-nuclear war, and the firmer will be the security of States. Mr. Dean declared in his speech that, since the Soviet Union had learnt to tolerate the existing military balance with all its components, including the so-called military bases, it "will just have to reconcile itself to living with that same balance during most of the disarmament process" (ENDC/PV.92, p.16). We can answer the representative of the United States thus: the Soviet Union, as a State concerned with its own security and with the maintenance of general peace and the security of all peoples, cannot be content that there should remain in the world dangerous hotbeds of war like foreign military bases on the territory of other States. When we protest against foreign military bases and demand their elimination as one of the most urgent tasks of disarmament, we are fighting not only for our own security but also for the security of all countries and of all the peoples of the world. The demand for the elimination of foreign military bases receives ever-growing support from the States of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, from all the continents of the world. This task is long overdue and its accomplishment has become urgent. The Western Powers must realize this.

The Soviet Union is convinced that it is entirely possible to start general and complete disarmament by eliminating all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. We have agreed to the retention of a certain limited quantity of missiles at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States during the second stage (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art.5) but this step of ours is only an expression of our desire to enable the Western Powers

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

to withdraw their objections and accept the principle we have put forward, which is supported by the majority of mankind. The essence of our proposal is simple and clear, and there are no obstacles, except imaginary ones, to prevent the Western Powers from accepting this constructive proposal of ours. The statements of the Western Powers that they need some kind of preliminary elucidations from us to clarify the essence of our proposals are merely artificial.

In this matter, however, we came up against hard facts when the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom tried to evade our proposal for the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of a strictly limited quantity of certain types of missiles until the end of the second stage of disarmament. Once again the Western Powers resorted to their tactics of asking questions.

Avoiding a definite and direct answer to the question which had been put to them, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom really set themselves to torpedo this Soviet proposal. For this purpose they employed their proposal that we should engage in further technical studies of the details of this Soviet proposal, and at the same time they attempted to adapt our proposal to the principles of the United States draft treaty. We must say quite definitely that the principles of the United States draft treaty and the principle which is being put forward by the Soviet Union -- in company with the majority of States Members of the United Nations, as was shown by the debate at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly -- are incompatible. The United States proposals are based on the principle of retaining the possibility of waging a nuclear war until the end of general and complete disarmament, and even after that, since they have put forward the idea of equipping international armed forces with nuclear weapons. The principle which the Soviet Union maintains, and which is supported by the overwhelming majority of States, is that the world must be freed from the danger of nuclear war immediately, without delay, and at the first stage in disarmament. This is the principal difference between the two approaches, ours and that of the Western Powers. It will be possible to free the world from the danger of nuclear war, if we agree to begin disarmament with the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Implementation of this proposal would not threaten any State's security or any national interests. Furthermore, being anxious to reach agreement more rapidly we agreed to make a few exceptions in order

(Mr. Tsarukin, USSR)

to give the Western Powers further guarantees and to help them to free themselves from their baseless and obviously artificial apprehensions. By acting thus we showed the utmost good will without sacrificing the universal and paramount interests of the nations, which demand that present and future generations should be saved from the catastrophic results of a nuclear war. There can be no compromise with nuclear war.

At the recently-ended session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, pointed out the urgent necessity for the immediate solution of the disarmament problem and for removal of the threat of nuclear war. He once more emphasized, and I quote his words: "We declare solemnly once again that all our activities in the field of foreign policy will be aimed at achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament." The Soviet Union has always maintained and will continue to maintain a wide-open door for the attainment of a mutually-acceptable solution. In spite of the bellicose, harsh and uncompromising tone of Mr. Dean's statement of last Friday, 14 December, we nevertheless do not wish to give up all hope.

We noted the remark Mr. Dean let fall that the present United States proposals are not the last word of the United States in the disarmament negotiations (ENDC/PV.92, p.17). If this is so, we hope that the Western Powers, realizing the great responsibility they assume in the eyes of the nations when they avoid solving the basic problems of disarmament, will draw the necessary conclusions and display the goodwill that will enable us to reach agreement on the most important problems of our time -- the problem of general and complete disarmament.

In conclusion, I should like to make a few comments in connexion with the statement which the United States representative made today on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The main issue that now divides the Soviet Union and the United States in regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is inspection. The Western Powers continue to insist on compulsory inspection, while the Soviet Union, basing itself on the practical experience of States and on a strictly objective assessment of the scientific data, believes that inspection is not necessary in order to reach agreement on the banning of all types of nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Isaranin, USSR)

The Soviet Union stands firmly on that ground. It is precisely this difference on the question of inspection, and on the question of international control posts, that prevents us from reaching agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

We put forward our compromise proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations (ENDC/FV.86, p.35) because we desired to provide the Western Powers with further guarantees in relation to control over the prohibition of nuclear tests.

We are trying thus to circumvent the serious obstacle to agreement constituted by the Western Powers' demand for on-site inspection and the establishment of an international control system.

Those are the aims we are pursuing in putting forward the proposal for automatic seismic stations.

We accepted the idea of using automatic seismic stations because it would enable the latest scientific achievements to be used for the purpose for which we are taking part in the present negotiations -- the purpose of banning all nuclear weapon tests for all time.

During the previous meetings of our Committee, and especially in the recent meetings of the Sub-Committee, we have been asked by the Western Powers what these automatic stations would be like and what their technical equipment would be. In other words, they have asked us for technical details. They considered that a great drawback to our proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations was that it did not reveal the technical details. However, any objective person would say that precisely the absence of technical regulations in the Soviet proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations is not its drawback but its great merit. It is precisely this absence of technical regulations in our proposal that shows the desire on our part for joint -- and I emphasize "joint" -- elaboration of the technical aspects of the proposal for automatic seismic stations; and this should be bound to satisfy both sides.

The question of what is to be put into the automatic stations we wish to solve in collaboration with the Western Powers. By this proposal we offer the United States and the United Kingdom a wide field for collaboration, so that they also can contribute to the work. But these details can and should be agreed after we have reached agreement in principle with the United States on the use of automatic stations as an adjunct to national detection systems without the demand for inspection.



(Mr. Tsarenkin, USSR)

During recent meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the three-Power Sub-Committee, the Western Powers have often repeated the charge that the Soviet position has "no logical and consistent basis either in scientific fact or in political reality" (ENDC/SC.1/PV.49, p.5). The United States representative repeated this both at the last meeting of the three-Power Sub-Committee (ENDC/SC.1/PV.50, pp.3-10 et seq.) and in his statement today.

However, it follows clearly from what has been said that the Soviet Union's position is in fact firmly based on political reality. We base ourselves on the desire to take scientific facts into account to the fullest extent and on the need to take into account the security interests of the State. We have been reproached because the Soviet Union is supposed not to desire international co-operation and co-ordination. The very reverse is the case. Our proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations and for elaboration of the technical aspects jointly with our Western partners is the clearest confirmation of the Soviet Union's desire to co-operate both with the Western nuclear Powers and with other countries.

In his statement at the penultimate meeting of the Sub-Committee, Mr. Dean raised a puzzling question (ENDC/SC.1/PV.49, p.6): why, if the Soviet Union considers the system of national seismic stations fully adequate, does it agree to the setting-up of automatic seismic stations? He attempted quite artificially to deduce from this that we, that is the Soviet Union, are not sure of the reliability of the work of national detection systems. The artificiality of such deductions is obvious. We have been and continue to be firmly of the opinion that the existing national detection systems are fully adequate to ensure control over the observance by States of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Our agreement to the setting up of automatic stations is a direct concession to the United States of America, and only confirms our readiness to co-operate with the Western Powers in organizing a system of control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Incidentally, in the statement to which I have just referred the United States representative made an interesting point. He correctly stated that the setting up of automatic seismic stations might be useful, since they would themselves provide objective data and could serve as a check on the work of national detection systems (ibid., p.10). From this, it seems, a second conclusion could be drawn, namely, that the Soviet Union, in submitting the proposal

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

for the use of automatic seismic stations, is thereby providing the Western Powers with further assurance of the adequate functioning of national detection systems. This fact alone increases the capabilities of States in keeping check on one another and to a certain extent introduces a definite international element of control in regard to national systems, thus increasing confidence in the data which the international centre will receive from national stations in the course of implementation of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests.

All that I have said illustrates the goodwill that guided the Soviet side when it proposed making use of the idea for automatic seismic stations put forward at the Pugwash Conference. Unfortunately, however, we are still obliged to note in the statements by the representatives of the United States and the other Western Powers a biased attitude to the proposal for automatic seismic stations. Despite the Western representatives' declarations that they are prepared to study and discuss proposals for stations of this type objectively and without any pre-conditions, we nevertheless note persistent attempts by them to squeeze the idea of setting up such stations into the old Western plan of control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. They repeat to us from one meeting to another that the Western Powers will be prepared to use automatic seismic stations if their demand for international observation posts and compulsory on-site inspection is accepted. We have already stated repeatedly that the idea of setting up automatic seismic stations, and our agreement to use this idea, had its origin in the fact that we were confronted with an irreconcilable difference on the question of inspection. It was necessary to overcome that difference in some way in order to ensure a positive solution to the problem of ending nuclear weapon tests. It is our conviction that the additional capabilities of control created by the installation of automatic seismic stations in conjunction with certain elements of international control, of which we have already spoken, will make it possible to remove the obstacles that have arisen in connexion with the question of inspection and to do without inspection in carrying out control. In this sense our step is a compromise, a step taken to overcome the remaining differences between us. If we had not been seeking for ways out of the deadlock that has arisen in connexion with the question of on-site inspection, the question of using automatic seismic stations would not have been raised at all. This is political and scientific reality. When, moreover, we tell our Western partners

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

that we see in the automatic stations a way of getting round the controversial issue of inspection, this in no way means that we are trying to impose our point of view on them. Automatic seismic stations are by no means a Soviet invention, and we could easily do without them altogether. In agreeing to the setting up of automatic seismic stations on our territory, together with certain elements of international control, about which we have spoken -- in the form of participation by foreign personnel in delivery of the apparatus of the stations to the sites and its return to the international centre -- we are making, I repeat once again, a definite concession to the point of view of the Western side. That is the only interpretation to be given to the existing situation and our willingness to accept the idea of automatic seismic stations.

Unfortunately, despite the declaration of the United States representative, Mr. Dean, that they are prepared to consider the question of automatic seismic stations without any pre-conditions, the Western Powers are trying in every possible way in their demands to insinuate these conditions. All we have so far heard from the Western side is the assertion that the Western Powers are prepared to consider automatic seismic stations as an adjunct to the control system proposed in the United Kingdom-United States documents submitted in August 1962 (ENDC/58, ENDC/59). If the Western Powers continue to insist on that point of view, it is clear that we cannot expect any positive results in our negotiations. Our Western partners should avail themselves of the opportunity afforded them by the proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations for control purposes as an adjunct to the already-existing national detection posts. This is the direction in which lies the possibility of arriving at a positive and mutually-acceptable solution to the problem of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests for all time.

In conclusion, I should like to say that I am bound to express regret that today's statement by the United States representative, Mr. Dean, did not contain any indication that the United States is prepared to re-examine its position, which has led our negotiations into an impasse, but is insisting on its demand for inspection and an international control system. Mr. Dean's statement shows that the Western Powers still maintain their old position. We note this with great regret, since it clearly holds out no hope of arriving at an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Pseropkin, USSR)

The United States representative, Mr. Dean, insisted again today on switching our discussion of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests to discussion of the technical aspects of the proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations, instead of reaching an understanding with us now on the basic principles of an agreement. We have already explained at the forty-eighth meeting of the Sub-Committee and at other meetings why a technical discussion at the present time would be useless and even harmful. In fact our negotiations are now at a deadlock and we find nothing clever or encouraging in re-inforcing the present deadlock in our negotiations with yet another deadlock which will inevitably, I emphasize, inevitably arise if we start a technical discussion without having reached a preliminary understanding on the basic principles of an agreement. That deadlock will inevitably arise if we take the path of discussing technical details, as the Western Powers propose, at the present time before we have reached an understanding on the basic principles of an agreement. If technical discussions in connexion with the use of automatic seismic stations are held in the circumstances where the Western Powers continue to maintain their former position, namely, continue to insist on their demand for an international observation system with on-site inspection, differences between us are bound to arise. Because --- and I draw the Committee's attention to what I am about to say --- in that case, when discussing the technical aspects of the problem the Soviet side will base itself on a national system of observation, whereas, the Western side will base itself on an international system of observation; the Soviet side will not envisage inspection, whereas the Western side will do so and will approach the technical aspects of the discussion, taking into account their demand for on-site inspection. All this shows that we should first reach an understanding on the basic principles of an agreement. We believe it is now possible to agree on control over an agreement for the prohibition of all tests, all nuclear weapon tests, without inspection, on the basis of the use of national detection systems and automatic seismic stations with certain elements of international control, of which we have already spoken. Not until then can we proceed, fruitfully and without the danger of once again driving the negotiations into deadlock, to discuss the technical aspects of the proposal for the use of automatic stations.

Baron von PLATEN (Sweden): I may perhaps wish to revert at a later stage to the observations which Mr. Dean has made about the reports coming from Stockholm regarding Soviet nuclear tests. I can only say at this stage that what Mr. Dean has said corresponds to the reports which I have so far received.

Turning now to my main statement, let me say that to make generally acceptable and successful plans for general and complete disarmament is, as we know, an infinitely difficult and time-consuming task. For this reason I cannot, with all due respect to you, Mr. Chairman, fully share the pessimistic assessment which you made recently when speaking of the achievements --- or lack of achievements --- of this Conference. There is, however, no denying that we have met with difficulties. In so far as they are related to the complexity of the problems, and as long as they are, so to say, inherent in our task, we have to face and accept those difficulties. But some of them may not be altogether necessary and could perhaps be avoided. I will make some brief comments on this subject.

One of our difficulties lately has been a rather time-consuming discussion regarding principles versus details. I am of the opinion that the use of the label, or concept, of "principle" in no way exempts us from putting the picture in focus and supplying our ideas with such details as to make them acceptably clear. That is one side of the coin. But there is another side. If one delegation launches an idea or proposal, that does not discharge other delegations from responsibility for aiding in the work of making that proposal clear, realistic and acceptable. We are all involved in a joint effort. This should be directed to making a clear blueprint for disarmament without, one need hardly add, blurring the main outlines by unnecessary details.

Some of our difficulties may stem from the fact that we try to do two things at the same time. We try to solve the problem of how to plan and implement general and complete disarmament. But in this work there is involved a secondary, though most important, task of maintaining continuous balance and equilibrium between the military forces. This problem, for very obvious reasons, contains an element of guess-work in two dimensions, first regarding the actual situation, and, secondly, regarding the future situation as it may develop under the impact of unpredictable factors, such as further scientific and technological advances.

Already this factor of uncertainty makes our work difficult. The problem of equilibrium is, however, still further complicated by the fact that it contains an element of negotiating, bilateral bargaining in a sense, between two great blocs. This is

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

perhaps inescapable. But it would be to our detriment and would add to our difficulties if we over-emphasized in our plenary discussions this aspect of negotiation and bargaining. Once the problem is presented and the relevant facts given, it is not advanced by accusations or repetition. I agree with what the representative of Romania said this morning: there should be no victors and no vanquished in these negotiations here (supra, p.12). I would go one step further: I dislike even the concept of "concessions" when we put forward new proposals. I should, rather, like to see them as contributions to carrying out our task.

Though Mr. Dean modestly claims that the co-Chairmen do no work, I venture to hope that they nevertheless do have useful discussions. These talks in camera may be more useful when it comes to negotiating about balance and equilibrium than repetition of detailed exposés at plenary meetings, however ingenious the variations on a given theme may be.

In previous statements the Swedish delegation has time and again stressed the importance of getting the disarmament process started. This first step may be the most difficult, critical and crucial one. Our chances for general success would, however, increase with partial success. Once general and complete disarmament is started, even if the beginning be modest, a tremendous train of events is set in motion. Even a humble start may give us renewed courage and faith to tackle the many remaining problems. We would also show the world that unity and positive results were possible.

The Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr. Nilsson, speaking recently in the United Nations, said:

"It is possible that the comprehensive schemes which have been presented by the Soviet Union and by the United States in the form of draft treaties can by painstaking negotiations be brought together into one agreed blue print for disarmament. But we should not limit ourselves to this work. We must try to give to the house of disarmament a solid foundation so that it can weather temporary political storms even if it is only partially finished. For this purpose we wish to stress that the greatest importance should now be attached to the first few steps, to stage I according to the draft treaties, or even to what might be called 'pre-stage-I measures'....

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

"The pattern must be: first, freezing of the present armaments level under an agreed 'regulation of armaments'\* scheme, to borrow a seldom used term from the United Nations Charter. Thereafter, as confidence grows, bolder moves towards actual disarmament. I need not say that the 'pre-stage', that of freezing the present situation, implies in fact the preservation of the status quo in relation to military power."

(A/C.1/PV.1270, p.12)

This trend of thought seems to be reflected also in the consensus of the General Assembly as expressed in resolution 1767 (XVII). Here it is specifically stated in operative paragraph 3:

"Recommends that urgent attention should be given by the Eighteen-Nation Committee to various collateral measures intended to decrease tension and to facilitate general and complete disarmament". (A/RES/1767 (XVII), ENDC/64)

Thus we find good reason to suggest that during our after-Christmas session we should pay increased attention to a variety of collateral measures. I use the term "collateral" in its widest sense, including pre-stage-I and/or early-stage-I measures. These can obviously be discussed according to a plan agreed upon by the two co-Chairmen. But I should find it rather unpromising if we were limited to a selection of exclusively Western and Eastern proposals. We hope that in this field the eight non-aligned countries will also be able to submit constructive and useful ideas of their own. The Swedish delegation, in any case, reserves its right to submit further proposals for pre-stage-I or early-stage-I measures.

On 22 May 1962 I suggested for discussion one item: the reduction of the risk of war through accident. (ENDC/C.1/PV.6, p.37). The United States delegation has now made a substantial contribution to this proposal by submitting its paper dated 12 December (ENDC/70). I hope that further contributions will come from other delegations and that this will turn out to be an item which can be discussed usefully and with fair chances for success, in spite of its being neither an Eastern or a Western idea, but simply a non-aligned one.

It may be useful during our next term in 1963 to re-introduce our practice -- which was launched by you, Mr. Chairman, and the delegation of India -- of having informal meetings from time to time. This type of discussion and co-operation may be useful. Obviously we must continue as before with plenary meetings, plus meetings of the Committee of the Whole, plus any new arrangements which may serve our purposes.

\* Article 47.1

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

The form of our deliberations should under all circumstances correspond to our needs. Our modus operandi must suit us; we must not become slaves under our institutional arrangements. The fact that we have plenary meetings should not turn this Conference into a debating society or a clearing-house for set speeches. We are not here to make orations about peace and disarmament, but rather to serve, with or without eloquence, as architects for disarmament. Our task is urgent and important, and time is short.

Finally, a nuclear test ban treaty was, is and remains of utmost importance. It would be wrong not to remind the nuclear Powers once again, before our recess, of their great and grave responsibilities in this respect.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): On a point of procedure. I believe there is another speaker on the list after me. What I have to say will take, I think, some twenty minutes, and I was wondering whether the delegations here could perhaps restrain their impatience to hear what I have to say for another twenty-two hours or so. I really do not think that that delay would very much endanger the possibility of reaching any agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (India): Should we then stop now? That would mean having ten speakers tomorrow, but if they all spoke for no more than ten or fifteen minutes, it might work out satisfactorily.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Perhaps we might meet earlier tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN (India): Yes, let us meet at 10 a.m. tomorrow if necessary. Would the Conference like to stop now and continue tomorrow at 10 a.m., or go on now and hear the representative of Canada?

Baron von PLATEN (Sweden): I propose that we hear the representative of Canada now, and start at 10 a.m. tomorrow.



Mr. TARABALOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I propose that, rather than have two meetings tomorrow, we should continue for another hour now. I think that representatives might prefer to work another hour to-day rather than have an overloaded day tomorrow. In that way we might avoid an afternoon meeting tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN (India): As there seems to be considerable feeling in favour of continuing at least for the present, we will in any case hear the representative of Canada now, and afterwards it can be decided whether we hear any more speakers today or meet tomorrow at 10 a.m., or both. I call on Mr. Burns.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): This morning I am turning again to the problem which in the opinion of the Canadian delegation, must remain the prime concern of this Conference until we find a solution -- that is, the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. It is a grave disappointment to the Canadian delegation -- and I am sure it is to the other delegations here -- that during this last round of negotiations the nuclear Powers have failed to conclude the test ban agreement which everyone has been hoping for so earnestly. When this Conference reconvened on 26 November, we had before us an urgent appeal from the General Assembly, I refer to resolution 1762 A (XVII) and particularly paragraph 3, which was unanimously supported. That paragraph urged:

"... the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to settle the remaining differences between them in order to achieve agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing by 1 January 1963, and to issue instructions to their representatives on the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to achieve this end;" (A/RES/1762 (XVII) - ENDC/63)

The debates in this Conference and in the Sub-Committee since 26 November regrettably show that thus far the representatives of the nuclear Powers have not received the necessary instructions from their governments. We deeply deplore that this unanimous appeal by all States Members of the United Nations has to date gone unheeded.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

It is all the more disheartening that so little progress has been made in the last weeks when all the elements which should permit an early solution acceptable to both sides seem to be at hand -- or so it appears to the Canadian delegation. Time and again it has been pointed out in this Conference and elsewhere how narrow is the area of difference which now separates the nuclear Powers. Both sides are in accord that those tests which are the most dangerous from the viewpoint of both the nuclear arms race and the hazards they present to the health of mankind can be stopped, and stopped now, on the basis of an agreement providing for only national detection means to ensure that all have confidence that their permanent cessation is being observed. So the area of dispute, as has been said many times, is narrowed to only one sector -- that is, what is required to give all parties the assurance that the obligation to cease underground tests is being complied with.

It is difficult indeed to accept that it is beyond our ingenuity to get over this final hurdle. Certainly there has been no lack of hints, advice and suggestions on how to surmount them. The memorandum (EMDC/28) of 16 April presented by the eight non-aligned members of this Conference, a memorandum which has been accepted by both sides as a basis for negotiations, was the first major step in the series of compromise solutions presented for the consideration of the nuclear Powers. The seventeenth session of the General Assembly endorsed that memorandum and, in resolution 1762 (XVII), went further in offering a practical guide to the final solution of the problem. Recognizing that in the underground environment a serious difference of view exists regarding the capability of monitoring compliance with an agreement by external instrumentation alone, the General Assembly recommended in paragraph 6 of its resolution that the nuclear Powers:

"... should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum and taking into consideration other proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission;" (A/RES/1762 (XVII) - EMDC/63)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation wishes once more to pay tribute to the recent efforts of the eight non-aligned members of this Conference to build on their own memorandum of 16 April and on the terms of the resolution I have just quoted. In our view, those delegations have come forward with constructive proposals which, when taken together, contain in broad outline all the elements which are necessary to satisfy the legitimate concerns of the nuclear Powers.

I should like to review briefly these proposals advanced by the representatives of the uncommitted nations. As I understand them, their suggestions contain the following basic ideas - first, an immediate agreement prohibiting tests in the three environments where no control problem exists; second, an interim arrangement to stop underground tests while a final agreement is being negotiated; and, third, the establishment of an interim international scientific commission to operate during the interim arrangement. The functions of the interim international scientific commission, to take the Swedish formulation, would be three-fold. It would provide: "technical and scientific information and certain investigations." (ENDC/PV.84, p.19) I take this to mean that a major and perhaps the most important task of the interim commission would be to study the adequacy of distant instrumentation as a means to detect and identify underground tests with a view to formulating recommendations, in the light of the actual experience gained during the period of the interim arrangement, on whether on-site inspection will be a necessary and continuing element in a permanent agreement.

The second function of the interim commission - and I quote again from the Swedish proposal - would be to: assist "in the technical elaboration of the detection system and the data exchange." (ibid.) It seems to me quite obvious that in a final agreement which will rely heavily on national detection systems it will be essential to mould existing stations into a co-ordinated and effective network and, where necessary, to recommend improvements in the system as a whole, including the installation of additional stations of high standard. This is a task which is envisaged for the commission in the eight-nation memorandum and to which, so far as I am aware, none of the nuclear Powers has objected.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Thirdly, the interim international commission would perform the functions which the eight-nation memorandum envisages for a permanent commission and which are set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of that memorandum. Those provisions are well known to all of us. There has, of course, been a difference of view among the nuclear Powers concerning their interpretation but, in our opinion, recent comments by non-aligned representatives in this Conference have been most helpful in clarifying their intent. The most important consideration here is that States would be obliged to give the international commission the evidence necessary to satisfy it concerning the nature of any event which the commission judged to be doubtful or unidentified -- including in some cases invitations for inspection. Failure to satisfy the commission in this way would be a breach of the agreement and would free other parties to the agreement from any obligations they had assumed under it.

What has been the reaction of the nuclear Powers to these suggestions? In the plenary meeting on 5 December, Sir Michael Wright, speaking for the United Kingdom, said:

"If the Soviet Union wants more time for negotiation on either of those proposals" -- he was speaking of the terms of a final comprehensive treaty -- "then let us carry out the recommendation in operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) and conclude a permanent agreement without international verification in the three fallout environments with an interim agreement on the underground environment." (ENDC/PV.87, p. 13)

In the same statement the United Kingdom representative made it clear that his government was prepared to give sympathetic consideration to the suggestions advanced by the non-aligned representatives in this Conference and that he was anxious to give "further impulsion to these initiatives and suggestions". (ibid. p.12)

Later at the same meeting Mr. Dean, the United States representative, said: "... these suggestions merit careful consideration ..." (ibid., p.32). And again, I note from the verbatim record that on 18 December in the nuclear Sub-Committee Mr. Dean stated:

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"The United Kingdom and the United States pointed out that that was an interesting and important move and that they would study it in the light both of the General Assembly's recommendations and of their own positions regarding adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events, as set forth in their comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58)." (ENDC/SC.1/FV.50, p. 9)

So far the Soviet representative appears to have adopted a negative attitude to the approach which has been suggested. I confess that his arguments against an interim arrangement to halt underground tests continue to puzzle and disappoint me. Although I have carefully studied the comments on this subject which he made on 3 December, I am unable to understand his objections. Mr. Tsarapkin appears to have given his main reason for opposing an interim arrangement when he said that it:

"... conceals in a disguised form, an attempt to reduce the whole matter to a partial agreement, leaving the Western Powers free to carry out underground nuclear weapon tests." (ENDC/FV.86, pp. 31 and 32)

Surely this is a curious charge to make against a suggestion which has had the support of the majority of States Members of the United Nations as well as the majority around this table, including the non-aligned members. Of course, we would all regard an immediate comprehensive and permanent ban on all tests as the ideal solution. The whole point of suggesting an interim arrangement for the cessation of underground tests is that such an arrangement appears to offer the best possibility of resolving the remaining differences which have so far blocked the conclusion of a permanent agreement. Under such an arrangement, the Soviet Union would have the opportunity of demonstrating to an interim scientific commission, made up largely of scientists from non-aligned States, that it is right when it claims that on-site inspection is unnecessary to ensure that an agreement to halt underground tests is being respected by all parties. If, after a trial period, the Soviet Union was dissatisfied with the functioning of the interim arrangement, it would not be bound by it for ever. As the representative of the United Arab Republic so justly remarked, if the arrangement were to fail "we would then revert to the present regrettable situation, but not to a worse one". (ENDC/FV.88, p.30)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I think I shall have to say a word or two about the question of "black boxes" in the light of some of the remarks made by the Soviet representative this morning since, as I understood him, he was saying that the Soviet Union offers this suggestion of "black boxes", or has adopted it, in lieu of the other proposals previously advanced which would perhaps require on-site inspection. But, as far as I know, no one has ever constructed one of these "black boxes". No one knows how the "black boxes" would work: no one knows if they are workable. The Soviet representative said that we could decide later between us what would be placed in the "black boxes". It seems to me that it is not a very logical or reasonable procedure to present a proposal for the use of a device which no one has ever made and which no one has ever tried out, and to say that it is going to solve the problem. It is not a very sound argument on the part of the Soviet Union to say: "This is a concession we have made -- to adopt this proposal to use 'black boxes'", which are completely untried and which, although they may contain useful possibilities, are, until they are proved scientifically, nothing but a suggestion.

The second point about this proposal is that the Soviet delegation is apparently not willing to prove it scientifically, but demands that it be accepted as a way out of the present impasse. In the way this suggestion has been put forward, I am afraid the Canadian delegation has not been at all convinced that it is going to be of any real help in reaching final agreement.

In conclusion, the Canadian delegation wishes to address an earnest appeal to all the nuclear Powers represented here to use the forthcoming recess to reconsider their positions in the light of the suggestions which have been put forward during this round of negotiations, and to come back to the Conference table with the instructions which will permit the conclusion early next year of this vital agreement which is so essential both to the peoples of the world and to the successful continuation of our work in this Conference.

As I expect this to be the last occasion on which the Canadian delegation will be speaking at this session, I should like to record our thanks to Mr. Epstein, as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and to the other United Nations officials who are assisting him -- the interpreters, the translators, the verbatim reporters, the editors, and all those members of the United Nations Secretariat who are providing the essential services which enable us to carry on our deliberations. We wish them a happier and more fruitful New Year.

The CHAIRMAN (India): The time is now twenty past one. There is still one more speaker on my list, and the United States delegation has asked for the floor in exercise of the right of reply. We have already nine speakers on the list for tomorrow's meeting. We could either hear the representative of Czechoslovakia and then the United States representative, in right of reply, now; or we could adjourn now and meet earlier tomorrow -- at 9.30, perhaps -- as I believe some representatives will be leaving tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. CAVALLETTE (Italy) (translation from French): Since I shall be the Chairman of tomorrow's meeting I am somewhat worried about the long list of speakers. At the risk of being thought selfish, I suggest that before adjourning the present meeting we should hear the representative of Czechoslovakia and then the United States representative.

The CHAIRMAN (India): If there is no objection we will proceed as suggested by the representative of Italy.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I am very grateful to the representative of Italy for his kind proposal, and, since all our colleagues are looking at their watches, I will confine myself to certain general observations in connexion with the conclusion of our work.

I should like at the outset to emphasize that this is the third time since the Eighteen-Nation Committee's work began that we have had to note just before a recess that negotiations, particularly on the main problem, namely, general and complete disarmament, have produced no tangible results. This should give us food for serious thought about the future prospects of our work. I should like to say quite frankly -- and in doing so I refer in particular to the statement of the United States representative on 14 December (ENDC/PV.92, pp. 21 et seq.) -- that we are faced with an especially urgent problem regarding the future course of our work.

From this statement of the United States representative the conclusion could be drawn that the future prospects are rather grim; but I do not feel that I need deal with this in any detail in my statement, since the Soviet Union representative has already done so today.

The third part of the negotiations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee has also shown very clearly that the main cause of the disappointing results in regard to

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general and complete disarmament is that the Western Powers still maintain their former uncompromising positions, which preclude all progress. At the seventeenth session of the General Assembly the majority of representatives of Member States expressed their deep concern at the results so far obtained, and appealed for a radical change in our Committee's work. This was also expressed clearly in General Assembly resolution 1767 (XVII) (ENDC/64), which appealed to the States Members of the Committee to obtain positive results and to continue their work "in a spirit of constructive compromise".

The attitude with which the delegations of the socialist countries, and particularly the delegation of the Soviet Union, have so far approached this question is in complete harmony with this appeal of the General Assembly. During the Committee's work the Government of the Soviet Union has submitted a number of proposals in which it has moved towards the Western Powers' position. It has in this way shown itself completely willing to reach a generally acceptable agreement. The most striking example of this systematic effort of the Soviet Government is the last of its proposals submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38). This, in our view, creates a suitable basis for removing the obstacles which have so far been blocking the path to agreement on the elimination of nuclear missile vehicles.

What, however, do we notice in the attitude adopted by the Western delegations? These delegations have in fact come with empty hands to the third part of the renewed negotiations, just as they did to the second part. Not only have they submitted no proposals of their own which could help to close the gap between the positions, but they have also adopted a negative, or at any rate an evasive, attitude towards the realistic proposals the Soviet Union has submitted in order to reach agreement.

If we are to carry on real negotiations, it is essential for both sides to show an equal measure of goodwill and of effort to find a generally acceptable compromise. Unfortunately, however, it has to be noted that the delegations of the Western Powers not only contribute nothing towards overcoming the existing divergencies of views, but even demand more and more concessions from the socialist countries. We have already had occasion to point out this curious approach to



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the negotiations. There is no need to emphasize again that it is not enough for one side alone to make efforts, since that cannot lead to any positive results.

What, however, causes us most concern in the position of the Western Powers is their stubborn refusal to take any effective measures to remove the threat of nuclear war. We have on several occasions pointed out that the reason for this position is that nuclear weapons and the ability to start a nuclear war are still central in their foreign policy and strategic thinking. This has received new confirmation in a recent interview given by the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. McNamara, to a reporter from the "Saturday Evening Post", Mr. Olson. In commenting on this interview the London "Times" of 27 November said that, judging from the words of Mr. McNamara, the aim of the United States was to make nuclear weapons an effective instrument of government policy. It therefore appears that the real obstacle is not the countless objections raised here by representatives of the Western Powers but, on the contrary, the continuing policy of the United States and of other Western Powers towards the nuclear armaments race. This is the true cause of the Western Powers' opposition to the Soviet Union's proposal to destroy nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament. This is where we believe the explanation can be found for the opposition they have so far shown to the last compromise proposal of the Soviet Union for solving this problem. This is also the reason why they are unwilling to agree to any radical disarmament measures.

This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the general tone and trend of the statement of the United States representative on 14 December. In his statement, Mr. Dean made no urgent appeal for radical measures of general and complete disarmament or for removal of the danger of nuclear war, the reality of which has recently been demonstrated dramatically by the Caribbean crisis. Instead he stated that the present United States policy consists in "the deployment of elements of the strength" of the United States and of the rest of the so-called free world "in areas closer to the perimeter" of the countries of the socialist bloc (ENDC/PV.92, p.14). He also stated that the military bases with which the NATO countries are trying to surround the socialist States are an essential component of the present day "military arrangements" of the so-called free world (ibid. p.15). In connexion with his repeated attacks on the socialist countries,

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Mr. Dean also said that the Western Powers could not accept any disarmament measures as a result of which the "free world" would become at all weaker than it is at present (ibid. p.12).

What then is the aim of the United States? To perpetuate the present dangerous situation, or to effect a radical cure by carrying out general and complete disarmament, which all the peoples of the world demand and for which the delegations of most member countries of this Committee are striving?

I must say quite frankly that the present attitude of the Western delegations, and particularly of the NATO countries, towards the main problems of general and complete disarmament gives rise to considerable doubt. The Western Powers still reject the proposal to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of general and complete disarmament and to eliminate bases on foreign territory, on the pretext that this would threaten their security because of the advantage in armed forces and conventional weapons possessed by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. It has already been demonstrated on numerous occasions by evidence from Western sources that these assertions have no foundation.

The delegations of the socialist countries have shown every readiness to meet these objections of the Western Powers. If the Western Powers are really afraid of the armed forces and conventional armaments of the socialist countries, they are at complete liberty to propose more radical disarmament measures in this field. However, they reject such measures also, on the pretext that this would disturb their existing system of military groupings and bases.

What then is the position? The Western Powers refuse to destroy either nuclear weapon vehicles or the weapons themselves; they also reject the elimination of military bases on foreign territory, and radical measures affecting armed forces and conventional weapons. What disarmament measures are they then willing to carry out? The measures they propose, especially in the first stage, are anything but effective for removing the danger of nuclear war or for real disarmament. That is why, in spite of all efforts to blame the socialist delegations for the sterility of our negotiations hitherto, all disarmament negotiations are caught in a vicious circle.

A similar situation can be seen in the negotiations for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We have before us General Assembly resolution 1762A (XVII)(ENDC/63),

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which calls urgently for the cessation of all nuclear tests not later than 1 January 1963. It calls for further negotiations on this matter, based on the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28). We have, however, to admit with regret that no substantial progress has been made in this field either.

Whereas the delegations of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have expressed their full support of this appeal by the General Assembly at its seventeenth session for the unconditional cessation of nuclear tests by 1 January 1963, the Western Powers have taken and are still taking a negative attitude to this on the pretext that they can accept no measures without international control and, in particular, without obligatory on-site inspection. Hence the Western Powers still refuse to accept the memorandum of the non-aligned countries as a basis for a reasonable compromise, and still insist that control over the cessation of underground nuclear explosions should include compulsory international inspection. The Soviet Union has suggested a way to bridge this gap, and has proposed making use of the idea of automatic seismic stations which could reliably detect and identify seismic events. However, the reaction of the Western nuclear Powers' delegations to this proposal is not very encouraging, since they still link its discussion to acceptance of the principle of compulsory on-site inspection. We suggest that the solution of this problem is not far distant, but depends on whether the Western nuclear Powers show sufficient goodwill to reach agreement. Mr. Dean indicated today that agreement might not be far off. We agree with him, and appeal to the Western nuclear Powers to take the step necessary to give speedy effect to this possibility.

We consider that these are the main reasons why our work has so far given no positive results. Until the governments of the Western Powers recognize these facts and commonsense prevails among them, we shall continue to encounter the same difficulties in our work as we have hitherto. I hope the right interpretation will be put on our words. It is not a question of shutting the door on further negotiations. It is merely necessary for the Western Powers' representatives to make use of the coming recess in this Committee's work to reflect seriously on the situation which has arisen and review their hitherto negative position. Otherwise we shall all be faced with the real danger that before the next recess in our work we shall again be forced to admit that we have been marking time to no purpose.

(Mr. Kurta, Czechoslovakia)

Having made these rather pessimistic remarks, I should like to look forward with optimism if only because this is the last statement I shall make -- and to take the opportunity of offering my best wishes for the New Year to all my colleagues and to the representatives of the Secretary-General. I hope you will not consider it too ambitious or presumptuous if I express the hope that the New Year will not only bring us all peace, health and renewed negotiations in our Committee, but will also bring us some new ideas and new political decisions which will enable us to make, in the spirit of constructive compromise, further progress in our negotiations for general and complete disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): The representative of the Soviet Union quoted (supra, p. 24) from the speech which I made in plenary meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 14 December. However, he omitted the last four words of the sentence which he quoted. Perhaps this was not intended; perhaps the omission occurred in the interpretation. However, I should like to read what I actually said:

"United States officials will not be impressed by exhortations, such as those from the Soviet bloc delegations here, that the highest norm or standard for disarmament negotiations must be 'the elimination of the risk of nuclear war ...' -- and he omitted the following words -- "... in the first stage'". (EDC/PV.92, p.14)

The following sentences read:

"Eliminate it we intend to in our overall disarmament programme, in our three stages, as advocated by the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, but of this you may be sure: we shall not be led into palpably one-sided moves at the beginning of disarmament which would clearly favour the Soviet bloc and jeopardize the security of the free world.

The first stage is not our ultimate goal: our goal is rather a complete programme of total and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. There is nothing sacrosanct about either the measures of the first stage or its duration. That is a portion of a total programme, to be executed in a time period subject to negotiation, ..." (ibid.)

The CHAIRMAN (India): I understand that it has been agreed that tomorrow's meeting shall start at 10 a.m.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its ninety-fourth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of the representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Canada and Czechoslovakia.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 20 December 1962 at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.

